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LEARNING: A MOMENTARY STAY AGAINST CONFUSION
by
Abigail Lipson

(I)
It assumes direction with the first line laid down, runs a course of lucky
events, and ends in a clarification of life -- not a great clarification, ... but in
a momentary stay against confusion.
---Robert Frost
When Robert Frost wrote these words in a preface to his Collected Poems, he was
referring to "the figure a poem makes" (Frost, 1939). He suggests that poetry emerges from
the interplay between intentionality and serendipity. Through a combination of orderly
progress and wild chance, we manage to produce out of chaos "a clarification of life." Most
importantly, though, Frost recognizes that the clarity achieved is impermanent, while the
confusion is ubiquitous.
When I first read this passage as a college student, I felt immediately that it
described not only the path of poetry, but the experience of learning. Often when we learn
something, our understanding emerges as a clear and stationary "figure" against a
background of buzzing motion. A mess of unconnected details coheres into a pattern; a
lead we follow on a hunch takes us to new insights; a brain abrim with jumbled words finally
cranks out a readable sentence. The clouds clear and we see a world that is crisply defined.
Our clarity, however, doesn't last. Inevitably, we identify new details that don't fit
the pattern; or we find that our leads lead only to more leads; or we realize that we have
more to say if only we can find a way to say it. We are confused again, striving for clarity
again, and seeking new understandings. And each new understanding we achieve is only a
"momentary stay against confusion."
So. Does learning, then, involve slogging through endless confusions with occasional
brief respites of clarity? How depressing! This doesn't seem to do justice to the excitement
and joy that are so much a part of learning. Or is learning a progression from one clarity
to the next, with refreshing interstices of confusion in between? Well, this is a nicer
thought, certainly, but it doesn't seem to acknowledge how stressful the learning process can
sometimes be. So what roles do clarity and confusion play in learning? Examining a
specific example will bring this question into focus, and ground our discussion of the
learning process in something concrete.
The following conversation between a college student and teacher is a composite of
several similar conversations I have had over the past few months. The student is presented
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with a statistics problem and solves it confidently, but quite incorrectly. In the ensuing
exchange, the student's clarity gives way to confusion, and from this emerges a new -- and
better -- clarity.
(II)
******************************************************************

The Heads-Tails Problem
Which of the following is the most likely sequence to result
from five consecutive flips of a fair coin?

(a) H H HT T
(b) TH HT H
(c) TH TT T
(d) HT HT H
(e) All four sequences
are equally likely.
********************************* ****** ***************************

Sl:

The answer is (b). Definitely.

Tl:

Can you say why?

S2:

Well, getting Heads or Tails is random, and (b) is the most random sequence.

T2:

What about (c)? Why do you figure that (c) is less likely to come up?

S3:

Well, it's got four Tails out of five, and three of them are all in a row. That doesn't
seem too likely. You'd figure to get about half and half, since it's random whether
you get Heads or Tails. Unless the coin's loaded or something.

T3:

Let's assume that we're dealing with a fair coin. What about (d)? That's got about
half Heads and half Tails.

S4:

No. It's just too regular. If you flip a coin, it comes out to about half and half, but
it doesn't just alternate like that - H TH T. You can't ever tell what the next throw
is going to be.

T4:

So you're pretty sure of (b ).

S5:

Yeah.

TS:

Let me check something out with you. If you flip a coin once, it could come up
either Heads or Tails, like you said before. There are a total of two ways it can
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come up, and you are equally likely to get either of them. Sot the chances of the
coin corning up Heads, say, are one-in-two. And the chances of it corning up Tails
are the same, one-in-two. Does that make sense?
S6:

Sure.

T6:

Okay. Now let me ask you something. If you flip a coin three times, which sequence
is more likely to come up on your three throws: Heads-Heads-Heads or Heads-TailsTails?

S7:

Heads-Tails-Tails, I would think.

T7:

Why is that?

S8:

Well, you're more likely to get a mix than all Heads. I would think the chances of
throwing Heads-Heads-Heads aren't very great.

T8:

Can you give me the exact odds? I mean, out of all the possible ways the coins could
come up on three throws, what are the chances that you'll throw a Heads-HeadsHeads?

S9:

Oh gosh, let's see. I'm sure there's a formula for that but I don't know it. I guess
I have to list out all the possibilities. Can I write this down?

T9:

Sure.

SlO:

Okay. HHH; TTT. Okay. HHT; HTH; THH. Hmm. Is that all the ones with two
Heads. Yeah. TTH; THT; HTT. So that's not too many. There are eight ways the
flips could come down. So getting HHH is only a one-in-eight likelihood.

TlO:

Great. And what are the chances that you'll throw Heads-Tails-Tails?

Sll:

Well there are a lot of chances for two Tails, so they'd be greater, the chances. Oh,
no. You mean exactly, getting exactly Heads-Tails-Tails, in that order? So wait a
minute, wait a minute. I guess I'll still have to say the chances of Heads-Tails-Tails
are greater than the chances of all Heads.

Tl 1:

You're right that we're talking about sequences here, about exact orders. So what
are the actual chances that you'll throw the exact sequence of Heads-Tails-Tails?

S12:

(Pause.) Oh, now I'm totally confused. Damn. This is more complicated than it
looks!

T12:

What are you thinking?
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S13:

First I was thinking that Heads-Heads-Heads was less likely, then I was thinking that
Heads-Tails-Tails has a one-in-eight chance, but that's the same chance of getting
Heads-Heads-Heads. So that doesn't make sense, and now I'm not sure.

T13:

What doesn't make sense?

S14:

Well, that Heads-Heads-Heads is just as likely. I would think it was less likely than
getting a mix. I don't get it.

T14:

Well, look at your list and answer this: Which is more likely, that you'd get HHH
or a mix of Heads and Tails?

S15:

Definitely a mix, like I said. Oh! Wait a minute! You were asking about~
sequences here, right? So it is more likely to get a mix, but maybe it isn't more like
to get exactly a particular mix, a particular order? I mean, they're all one-in-eight,
the chances for any particular sequence, no matter what it is. I ~ that makes
sense, doesn't it?

T15:

So getting Heads-Heads-Heads is just as likely as getting Heads-Tails-Tails? One-ineight?

S16:

Well, it doesn't sound right, but I think that's right. And you know what it makes me
wonder is if maybe before, I was thinking about all the mixes of Heads and Tails
together instead of particular sequences.

T16:

Can you say more?

S17:

Okay. It ls pretty likely to get some kind of mix, and it isn't very likely to get all
Heads, but then again it's not too likely that you'll throw any particular exact order
that you name. Any exact order of anything, of any Heads and Tails, is just as
unlikely, and that makes it just as likely. That actually makes sense.

Tl 7:

Yes it does. You want to take a look at the original question again?

S18:

Oh, yeah! Can I change my question? Can I say (e)? Definitely (e)! Boy, I'm glad
I didn't bet on this!
(III)

The first solution offered by the student is a common error. In fact, a great deal of
formal research has been conducted expressly to understand how people think about
stochastic problems like this one (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky, 1982; Konold, 1988). But
our interest here is not so much in why the student got this particular problem wrong, as it
is in the path he followed to his different and corrected conclusion.
Initially, the student was certain of his answer and clear in his formulation of the
problem. In his comments Sl through S5, he sounds confident and unperturbed, patiently
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explaining to the teacher what he sees as patently obvious reasoning. Then between TS and
TlO, the student encounters some challenges to the integrity of his initial understanding.
Responses to his teacher's questions can't be easily generated given his conceptualization
of the problem. But he is reluctant to abandon his initial understanding, since it is all he
has. In Sll he reaffirms his initial position, although with less confidence than he had
before.
As the conversation continues, our student encounters more new information and
puzzling questions and, between S12 and S14, he becomes "totally confused." He clearly
sees the inadequacy of his old way of construing the problem, but has only the vaguest of
hunches as to what a more adequate construal might be. He has left the solid ground of
his initial clarity and finds himself buffeted by a confusion of incomplete and incompatible
ideas. He appears to be quite uncomfortable.
Then between S15 and S17, the student's confusion begins to give way to a new
clarity, a different understanding than the one with which he began. He is no longer
clinging to his initial answer, as he was at first; and no longer simply lost and confused, as
he became next. He seems, instead, energized and motivated to explore this strange new
way of understanding the problem and to consolidate his speculations into a coherent
structure. In S18 he offers his revised solution with revived certainty.
(IV)
The basic pattern of this student's experience -- the figure his learning makes, to use
Frost's words -- is one we can find reiterated in many other contexts. For example, the
pattern generated here in a short ten minutes of the student's time matches an ontogenetic
pattern well recognized by developmental psychologists. Structural theories of intellectual
development, in particular, describe development over an organism's lifetime as "a process
of equilibration ... in which inadequacies of earlier forms of reasoning are encountered and
overcome by the construction of more adequate forms" (Basseches, 1989, p. 23). One might
say that the inadequacies of our particular student's reasoning on this particular problem
were similarly encountered and overcome by his construction of a more complex construal
of the laws of chance.
Piaget's central concepts of assimilation and accommodation, the constituents of the
process of adaptation, are relevant to our student's experience with the Heads-Tails problem
as well. (See Piaget, 1978.) Roughly, Piaget defines assimilation as the incorporation of
information or experience into already-existing cognitive structures (which corresponds to
our student's behavior in S3 and S4 as he accepts some gentle challenges to his initial
answer and responds to them from within the framework of his original solution).
Accommodation, in contrast, takes place when an organism's cognitive structures themselves
change in response to environmental demands, becoming more inclusive, complex, or
sophisticated (which corresponds to our student's eventual abandonment in S15 of his initial
problem-model in favor of a new one, after the original had proved inadequate to
addressing the questions posed by his teacher). All cognitive activity, according to Piaget,
involves aspects of both assimilation and accommodation.
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Cognitive-developmental theories describe a bigger picture, of course -- the
individual's growth through life stages -- than the one we have painted of our student's
momentary experience. But despite the difference in scale, the two pictures trace a common
pattern. Indeed, this same pattern can be seen on an even larger scale than the ontogenetic.
Thomas Kuhn's work on the structure of scientific revolutions, for example, describes on a
socio-historical scale the tendency for scientific thought to operate within the bounds of its
current "paradigm" unless and until it encounters significant anomalous data for which the
paradigm simply cannot account. Only then does a scientific revolution occur involving the
generation of a new and more accommodating paradigm (Kuhn, 1962).
(V)
But let's return to the smaller scale and our examination of real-time on-line
learning. Perhaps we can define more clearly the path our students take through clarity and
confusion in the learning process. Table 1 offers a five-step map of such a path. Each step
is described in terms of (a) its stability and the relative status of the student's "old" and
"new" understandings; (b) the most immediate challenge which the student faces; (c) the
student's prevailing behavioral tendencies, and (d) the teacher's perceptions of the student.
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(1) INITIAL STATE
Initial and final states are both :
• Stable
• Low Stress
• High confidence
The final state is more complex, inclusive, or adaptive than the initial state.

(5) FINAL STATE

(2) RESISTANCE

(4) REORGANIZATION

DESCRIPTION: Unstable state . Initial framework
still works in most cases, but student realizes that
there 's something not quite right with it, or
something not quite understandable about the data
they are presented with . Student may say: " But!
But! ," " Uh-oh ," or " That can't be ... "

DESCRIPTION: Unstable state. Student begins to
embrace new understandings , and abandon old
ones. Student not only recognizes the inadequacies of old way but has some ideas of how to
correct them , how a new way of understanding
might work. Student may comment: " I think I' m
getting it! " or " It's starting to make sense, but it
sure is hard ."

Challenge: Student feels threatened , that there is
something dangerous going on . Moderate stress .
Behavior: Student is likely to feel defensive, and
will try to return to original stable state; will reject
new information if it can 't be assimilated .
Teacher: Teachers often get the impression at this
stage that the student is " fighting it," is being stubborn or stupid .

Challenge: Student may not yet be sure of new
understandings, so there is a sense of risk-taking ,
and daring in trying them out. Moderate success.
Behavior: Student is curious , excited , motivated
to experiment or explore .
Teacher: Teachers get the feeling that the student
is trying hard , appreciating the teacher's work.

(3) DISRUPTION
DESCRIPTION: Unstable state. Old ways no
longer work, but there's no new way in sight. Student can articulate the inadequacies of initial
assumptions, but as yet see no way of correcting
them . Student may say: "I just don't know any
more," or " I hate this!" or "Now I'm all confused."
Challenge: Student's encounters with the world
all seem to end in failure; there is no firm conceptual ground to stand on . High stress.
Behavior: Student feels frustrated and confused ,
and may seek either internal or external attributions for failure . Tendency to want to quit.
Teacher: Teachers feel their students are
discouraged , not trying hard enough, not patient
enough.

Table 1:
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FROM CLARITY TO CONFUSION AND BACK AGAIN

The first step illustrated in the table, the INTERNAL STATE, refers simply to the
student's starting point: his existing understanding of a problem; his existing competence
at a skill; his existing store of accumulated knowledge. I have labeled this state a stable
one, in recognition of the human tendency to "stick with what we know." In fact, it makes
good adaptive sense, when we have some workable way of understanding things, to keep
right on using it. We tend to interpret new information in ways that maintain or confirm
our existing understandings and we tend not to recognize contradictory information even
when we encounter it (see, for example, Chapman and Chapman, 1982). In this state of
clarity we experience little stress and high confidence. We feel we know what we're doing.
Problems only arise when we encounter insurmountable challenges to our familiar
way of understanding things. The second phase illustrated in Table 1 describes our usual
response to such challenges: RESISTANCE. Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, two
researchers known for their work on the heuristics and biases that arise when people
encounter situations of uncertainty, have noted the general "reluctance to revise a rich and
coherent model, however uncertain, and the ease with which such a model can be used to
explain new facts, however unexpected" (Tversky and Kahneman, 1982, p. 128).
Other researchers point out that, as we encounter new information which simply
cannot be understood within our existing conceptual frameworks, we find ourselves facing
a cognitive dilemma (Metalsky and Abrahmson, 1981). We have two choices: We can
either dispose somehow of the new information by denying or distorting it, and thus
maintain our original beliefs, or we can discard our beliefs in light of the new information.
Whenever they possibly can, people will tend to resolve this dilemma in favor of their prior
beliefs. (See Alloy and Tabachnik, 1984). As Jacques Barzun has commented, a student's
mind is like a strong rubber band, which a teacher "can stretch a little by pulling hard, but
which snaps back into shape the moment you let go" (Barzun, 1982, p. 1).
If the world continues to present us with information that repeatedly and powerfully
challenges our existing conceptions, we will eventually find it impossible to hang on to them.
At this point we are likely to become uncomfortably confused or uncertain. The third box
in Table 1 describes this phase as one of DISRUPTION. Several developmental
psychologists have suggested that, however uncomfortable such disruption may be, it is both
inevitable and necessary in order for growth to occur (e.g., Perry, 1970; Kegan, 1982). We
are motivated to resolve the disruption, and in doing so we develop a more sophisticated
understanding of the world.
The fourth box in the Table describes a phase of REORGANIZATION. At this
point in a student's problem-solving effort, the motivations of the student are forwardlooking, rather than backward-looking as they were in the RESISTANCE phase. The
student is trying to consolidate a new and effective understanding rather than trying to hold
on to an old and ineffective one. The result is the FINAL STATE: a new stability, a state
of confidence and certainly much like the INITIAL STATE but at a new level of complexity
or adaptation.
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(VI)

The circle, or rather spiral, illustrated above is an abstraction. It doesn't describe
every learning experience. It may not even describe any learning experience. When a
student learns some discrete fact or engages some specific problem, this activity takes place
within a much richer and larger context. The five-step model described here is an artificial
isolation of factors that can't be so cleanly extricated from the complexity of human
existence. Furthermore, a brief replay of your own learning experiences will undoubtedly
reveal many whose paths followed quite a different route than the one mapped here.
Perhaps you approached a problem, not from an initial state of clarity, but from an initial
state of uncertainty; perhaps you by-passed resistance; perhaps you dwelled in disruption.
Still, despite the abstraction and artificiality of the five-step model presented above,
it does seem to capture two fundamental realities about the role of clarity and confusion in
learning. These can be summarized as follows:
(1)

Clarity, as a rule, feels better than confusion. We are motivated to keep
clarity if we have it and to seek it if we don't.

(2)

Confusion arises inevitably as we encounter in the world information or
experiences that challenge our current ways of understanding.

What do these observations tell us about how we might best go about the process of
teaching and learning? First, we should probably examine any intuitive assumptions we may
have to the effect that "Clarity is Good" and "Confusion is Bad." Clarity is good in many
ways, but our efforts to cling to it sometimes lead us to resist or avoid opportunities for
learning and growth. And confusion is bad in many ways, but it is also a source of joy in
life and a necessary prerequisite for certain kinds of development.
Second, we might derive from the model some ways of motivating ourselves in
moments of complacency and comforting ourselves in moments of frustration. Precisely
when we feel most solidly settled in our ways of thinking, we could try to open our eyes to
new challenges. And precisely when we feel most confused and ungrounded, we can remind
ourselves that continued efforts will bring us around, eventually, to new clarities.
Learning at its best, as Frost says about a poem, "begins in delight and ends in
wisdom." We needn't resist as much as we sometimes do. We needn't despair as much,
either. Instead, we need to recognize that clarity and confusion are both, in their turn, the
stuff that learning is made of. Both should be welcomed and even pursued.
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